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Wrong-way risk in counterparty and funding exposures is most dramatic in the situations of 
systemic crises and tails events. A consistent model of wrong-way risk (WWR) is developed 
here with the probability-weighted addition of tail events to the calculation of credit valuation 
and funding valuation adjustments (CVA and FVA). This new practical model quantifies the 
tail risks in the pricing of CVA and FVA of derivatives and does not rely on a limited concept 
of linear correlation frequently used in many models. The application of the model is 
illustrated with practical examples of WWR arising in the case of a sovereign default for the 
most common interest-rate and foreign exchange derivatives. 
- 
Counterparty and funding risks in financial markets has been attracting much attention 
especially since the beginning of 2007-2008 global financial crisis. Both types of risks 
became major factors in the upheaval of quantitative finance with far reaching implications 
for the valuation and risk-management of financial derivatives. Credit Valuation Adjustment 
(CVA) and Funding Valuation Adjustment (FVA) to the price of a derivative are the 
manifestations of this upheaval as well as various corresponding regulatory measures such as 
CVA VAR (capital charge for CVA volatility) and liquidity ratios imposed on banks by the 
Basel 3 accord. 
The most dangerous manifestation of counterparty risk is the so-called wrong-way risk 
(WWR) – positive correlation2
In the context of counterparty risk or CVA risk-management, the “positive tendency” 
between the exposure and the likelihood of default is frequently expressed as a correlation 
between corresponding market factors and the counterparty’s default intensity. Several 
models were developed in the literature based on Merton’s bankruptcy model (Levy 1999)  
(Buckley 2011), stochastic dynamic credit models (Finger 2000)  (Redon 2006), parametric 
 between the counterparty’s default and the exposure (mark-to-
market or replacement value) - can be particularly harmful to the stability of the financial 
system and each individual bank’s balance sheet during extreme market dislocations (also 
known as tail events). Due to the interconnectedness of the financial system, major systemic 
or economic shocks triggered are greatly amplified by potential counterparty related losses 
and funding stresses, and especially so if further magnified by WWR. Importantly, the total 
large exposures of WWR type are most likely the consequence of a financial institution’s 
business model due to concentration, leverage and funding risks and therefore deserve a close 
attention and active management on all levels. 
                                                          
1 CVA Portfolio Management, WestLB, London. The views expressed are the opinions of the individual author 
only. The author received no financial support for this paper and he declares no competing financial interests. 
No opinion given in this article constitutes a recommendation by the author. 
2 More generally, the positive tendency of both quantities - the exposure and the probability of default - to 
increase during certain period but not necessarily in the sense of stable correlated, daily and no-lag, changes.  
dependency (Hull 2012)  and Gaussian copula (G. Cespedes J.C. 2010).  While these models 
are helpful in pricing and “daily” risk-managing of cross-gamma due to credit and market 
factor (as FX, rates, etc) correlations, these models are not reliable and even misleading in the 
cases of tail events and large economic cycle swings of multiple market asset classes 
involved in the CVA calculation. Practitioners tend to think in terms of scenarios and to be 
particularly concerned about WWR of tail events (Pengelley 2010), and from this point of 
view we develop a simple model which expresses the tail-risk events explicitly and therefore 
intuitively. The main challenge of WWR is to identify and to characterise various extreme 
WWR scenarios in order to be able to risk-manage and perhaps to steer or diversify the 
business away from WWR dangers; the presented tail-risk model helps to analyse WWR and 
is designed to be practical and “as simple as possible yet no simpler”. 
The motivation and the background. The full risk-management solution for the calculation 
of counterparty’s exposures and CVA reserves presents a formidable engineering and 
modelling challenge for financial institutions. A cross-asset portfolio dependent on hundreds 
of market factors requires a modular and scalable platform, and WWR is one of the last and 
complex requirements in the design of such a platform. In the backdrop of this complexity, 
the advantage of the proposed tail-risk model is that it can be conveniently developed as a 
modular “after-model” based on the base model by consistently incorporating tail-risk 
scenarios. 
The reliance on cross-asset correlations in the context of large CVA portfolios can be 
questioned. Not only these correlations can hardly be calibrated but, more importantly, this 
type of correlations is very unstable and variable3. Correlations can help to skew the centre of 
the distribution but they cannot model well the tails4. In addition to the various technical 
reasons, a fundamental reason to go beyond the conventional no-lag linear correlations is due 
to the nature of long-period (over and beyond 1-3 years) economic business cycles and trends 
as well as idiosyncratic5
                                                          
3 The analysis of various credit-FX, credit-rates, etc shows simply no definitive linear no-lag correlations over 
extended periods of time. The uncertainty of cross-asset correlations can be contrasted with other types of 
correlations which are more reliable and reinforced by the market for various reasons. For instance, FX-FX 
correlations between two FX rates with mutual currency are very natural and stable. Another example of a 
more persistent correlation which describes the skew volatility effect is the correlation between the 
underlying security and its volatility. 
 market reactions if seen across multiple asset classes. In theory and 
frequently in the markets reality, the growth and recession cycles are abated by central banks 
with rate hikes and cuts which are followed in turn by the corresponding changes in the 
demand for credit in the economy. These considerations lead to positive co-tendency between 
credit spreads and government rates observed on long-time scale of 1-2 years, while no-lag 
correlation, in fact, changes the sign depending on the stage of the economic cycle (Lorenzen 
2011), see Fig.1. In the context of WWR modelling and risk-management, the institution 
must be as much concerned with large swings of economic cycles accompanied by possible 
actual defaults in concentrated exposures as with the daily volatility of CVA reserves due to 
daily correlations. 
4 Correlation-based models may not have fat tails in their distributions at all, or, at most, a fat tail on the one 
side of the distribution, while tail-risk approach can easily express fat tails on both sides of the distribution 
which is the reality of some markets. Furthermore, the effect of correlations in the tails of the distribution 
necessarily simulated via Monte Carlo in portfolio CVA calculations is typically very noisy due to insufficient 
averaging. 
5 For instance, dependent on the nature and timing of the governments’ interventions. 
The model. We consider a single stressed scenario of WWR added to the base model to 
explain the essence of the model, and we will generalise to multiple stress scenarios 
afterwards.  
One major stress scenario is the sovereign’s default accompanied by various market 
dislocations. In general, the main assumption of the model is that various stress scenarios 
(sovereign default, commodities shock, etc) can be defined in terms of stressed 
macroeconomic parameters (stressed rates and discount curves, FX rates, commodity and 
housing prices, etc) and the probabilities of those stress scenarios. In our example of a 
sovereign default, the probability of the default can be implied from the sovereign CDS level. 
The expected positive exposure (EPE) which enters into the CVA calculation (Gregory 2012) 
is always meant to be the conditional exposure given the default of the counterparty. Since 
the major dislocation and associated WWR occur only when the sovereign defaults, the total 
EPE is the probabilistic sum 
       (1) 
where   is the conditional probability of sovereign default given counterparty’s 
default,  is EPE calculated under a stressed market, while  is calculated from the 
base model under the current market conditions. If the counterparty is the sovereign itself, 
then  and the reasoning is exactly the same as in the reference (Levy 
1999) in the case of a sovereign default. Note that in a crisis some of the market dislocations 
can be already expressed (priced in), so EPE will contain some or all effects of the 
stressed . To avoid this difficulty, we suggest a simple interpolation which 
smoothly connects the unstressed and stressed limits6: 
 
where  is still the current market EPE,    is EPE calculated with the market 
parameters stressed to certain absolute levels. While  is the threshold default 
probability which is defined as near-default or half-life threshold and marks the crossover 
between crisis (stressed scenario) and non-crisis limits. For instance, in our example, this 
threshold could correspond to sovereign CDS level of 1000bps.  
We can define an effective parameter  relating unconditional and conditional probabilities 
 in order to introduce relative strength of “the coupling” 
                                                          
6 The aim of the interpolating function  is to have a sharp transition between two limiting cases 
 (unstressed limit ) and  (stressed 
limit ). 
between different counterparties and their sovereign. The meaning of the coupling parameter 
 is transparent; the larger  corresponds to larger systematic relevance of the counterparty in 
the sense of coupling of the fates of the counterparty and its sovereign. For a major bank, this 
parameter may be large (certainly larger than 1, but still ) or small very much 
dependent on the specific country’s resolution of a default. If a company’s default is quite 
independent from the sovereign, this parameter is 1. In a special and unusual situation, if 
sovereign’s and counterparty’s default are mutually exclusive, then the parameter is zero. 
Combining all the above equations, we derive a final expression which expresses clearly the 
correction due to a stressed WWR scenario 
 
The simplicity of the model is underlined by a transparent meaning of all the parameters 
involved. Interestingly, WWR in the model is dynamic because  is the current-market 
implied probability from the market-based CDS.  In this sense the model also contains the 
correlation effect between sovereign’s and counterparty’s CDSs since the full CVA 
expression is the product of counterparty’s default probability (and therefore its CDS) 
and  which contains sovereign’s  in turn.  
Selected results of the model’s application. In this section, we illustrate the application of 
the model by considering some liquid contracts. We start with an interest rate swap (IRS) of 
10 year maturity; the counterparty has CDS=300bps (flat curve, for simplicity), and the 
sovereign has CDS=200bps (for instance, one of the core countries in Europe). The interest 
rates are low with the upward slope across the maturities (as in April 2012). We specify a 
tail-event scenario for IRS by assuming that the rates will move by 500bps across the curve in 
the case of sovereign default. The only other assumption which we need to make is that the 
coupling parameter  is equal to 1 corresponding to “independent company” coupling 
strength.  
Without any WWR, CVA for payer IRS (paying fixed rate and receiving floating one) is 
equal to 7.8bps (or 0.078%) running. The payer IRS has WWR because our exposure on the 
swap increases if floating rate increases. With WWR CVA for payer IRS becomes 12.7bps 
which is significantly higher than 7.8bps. Fig.2 illustrates various EPE profiles for payer IRS, 
which are the stressed exposure , the exposure  without WWR, and the total 
exposure  as well as forward mark-to-market (MtM). For comparison, the receiver 
IRS has a right-way risk (RWR) in this stressed scenario, and CVA without and with RWR is 
2.8bps and 2.4bps correspondingly. On the portfolio level, the imbalance between WWR and 
RWR is mainly determined by the nature of bank’s portfolio (usually, receivers make up 
most of derivatives’ exposure with uncollateralised corporate counterparties) and the types 
and probabilities of stressed scenarios. 
Another clear-cut example of WWR is the cross-currency swap (CCS) when in the final 
exchange of notionals we receive a notional in an external currency (i.e. USD) and pay in the 
country’s own currency (i.e. BRL) and the counterparty’s business is in the same emerging 
country (i.e. Brazil). In the scenario of a sovereign default, the emerging (BRL) currency is 
devalued and therefore our exposure spikes, while the credit spread of the counterparty will 
almost certainly widen, this is WWR. The cases of sovereign defaults in emerging countries 
and accompanied currency devaluations are very well-documents (South-East Asia crisis of 
1998, Russia, Argentina, etc).  
Let us consider the following assumptions: CCS of 5 year maturity, counterparty’s 
CDS=500bps, sovereign CDS=130bps, again , and the amount of the devaluation7
Since the stressed tail events are considered explicitly, the tail-risk model for CVA can be 
quite easily applied to any contracts or exposures including such important cases as CDS and 
a portfolio’s exposure under the collateralisation. In the case of collateralised exposures, bi-
lateral or via forthcoming central counterparties (CCPs), WWR in FVA is even more 
important, and this is what we consider next. 
 of 
BRL currency in the default is estimated to be 40%. The calculation based on the tail-risk 
model shows that CVA increases from 82bps to 87bps on the account of WWR. 
WWR in funding8. WWR in funding of derivatives positions is very critical due to frequent 
(daily, or, even, throughout the day in the case of CCPs) liquidity demands in the posting of 
the collateral. In the context of the funding, WWR is the “positive tendency” between an 
institution’s funding spread  and the collateral it is required to post against mark-to-
market (MtM) positions. For instance, in the case of a sovereign’s default shock, major banks 
of the country will face significantly higher funding spreads and may also need to post large 
amounts of collateral to other counterparties due to sudden change of interest rates and FX 
rates (for example, on a portfolio of CCSs). Without going into the complexity of 
collateralised trades pricing, we can derive the following expressions for the symmetric FVA 
in the presence of WWR in somewhat schematic form: 
 
where  is the funding spread at some forward time  ,   is the expected discounted 
forward MtM,   and  are the funding spread and forward MtM under 
stressed scenario, and    is the longest exposure date of the portfolio. The collateral required 
                                                          
7 The jump amount of FX devaluation can be implied from the so-called quanto CDS, a spread between CDS 
traded in home (internal) and hard (external) currencies, see for the detailed discussion (Ehlers 2006). 
8 For a consistent treatment of CVA, DVA, and FVA, see for instance the papers (Burgard 2011) (Morini 2011) 
and references therein. The distinction between unique bi-laterally agreeable price and economic value for 
either side of the transaction is even more pertinent in the context of WWR. 
for posting is , and the funding spread cost is paid on this amount. The current 
FVA is . Similarly to the considerations above, we need 
to have an interpolation factor in Equation (3), for instance in the form used 
above .  
To give a practical example, in the case of 10 year IRS payer considered above FVA= -
2.55bps with flat funding spread of 100bps. In the case of the above scenario of sovereign’s 
default and the institution’s funding spread widening to 200bps FVA becomes -2.96bps. 
Calibration. The meaningful calibration of any model for a large multiple-asset CVA book 
which includes WWR is challenging if not nearly impossible task. The tail-risk model needs 
the specification of the state of the world for each stressed WWR scenario. In the first 
instance of the model’s application, a trader or a risk-manager can specify the parameters of a 
WWR scenario based on experience and selective historical data, as demonstrated in the 
examples above. In particular, the counterparties can be classified into several broad WWR 
ratings, in analogy to credit ratings, and ascribed  (for low, medium, and high 
WWR) 9. After calibration, as a sanity check, the results of the tail-risk model can be assessed 
in comparison with correlation-based models. For instance, in the above example of 5-year 
USDBRL CCS, a correlation model has qualitatively similar increase in the EPE profile10
The generalisation for multiple independent and “orthogonal” stress scenarios is in principle 
straightforward where the same correction is summed over all tail events in Equation (3). The 
total probability of N tail events 
 due 
to WWR with the correlation of order of 20-40% between a hazard rate and FX rate.  
 should be kept low since the tail events are rare. 
While in the context of the sovereign default we can infer the market-implied probability of 
this tail event from sovereign CDS, for other types of shocks it is necessary to be imaginative 
yet practical to infer appropriate probabilities11
                                                          
9 By applying Bayes’ theorem, the coupling λ=P(Cpty│sov)/P(Cpty) =P(sov│Cpty)/P(sov) can be also estimated 
from historical data as either of the ratios of the probabilities. From the hedging perspective, we are interested 
in market-implied default probabilities rather than actual default probabilities (for the review, see (Giesecke 
2011). Market-based conditional and unconditional proxy-default probabilities can be estimated as the 
proportion of days counterparty’s CDS exceeded the threshold during a certain time period by applying the 
threshold condition used in Equation (2). 
. In general, the tail events can overlap and are 
not independent, and a coherent Bayesian net of the events needs to be constructed. The 
coherent stress testing and the importance of the tail-risk modelling are discussed in a recent 
book (Rebonato 2010), and WWR is a very natural context for the application of the tail-risk 
modelling and Bayesian approach. The importance of the focused modelling of WWR in the 
situation of the systemic contagion - a type of tail event - by models with FX jumps and 
increased volatility has been raised recently (Sokol 2012). 
10 In general, the tail-risk model and correlation models are of very different nature and their results do not 
need to be similar in any way. 
11 For instance, in the case of commodity shock the implied probabilities of large market moves can be implied 
from corresponding derivatives markets (i.e. one-touch or digital options). 
The discussion and the summary. The hedging of WWR is particularly important in the 
case of concentrated exposures across many counterparties; WWR exposure in the 
sovereign’s default example can be hedged with sovereign CDS and is proportional 
to . Practitioners already use essentially the tail-risk 
style analysis of the counterparty risk at several different banks to the author’s knowledge 
due to the simplicity and the practicality of the model. Stress testing is also now widely 
performed by regulators and by banks as a measure of the stability of the system as a whole 
and for each individual bank, and the stress testing and WWR modelling can be naturally 
integrated in the framework of the model.  
In conclusion, the presented tail-risk model can be used for the quantification and hedging of 
WWR in the context of counterparty and funding exposures as well a for capital and stress-
testing requirements based on the same  calculation. The methodical recognition of 
tail-events WWR and corresponding practical Bayesian calibration of such a model will help 
financial institutions not only to protect themselves from extreme events and deep cyclical 
economic stresses but also to benefit them by understanding the important WWR part of the 
economic value of counterparty and funding risks12
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Graph 1. The history of US Treasury 10Y yields and corporate spreads based on Moody’s 
Bond Corporate BAA Index (in % percentage value). Different periods can be seen with 










Graph2. Various exposures for a payer IRS. The stressed exposure is the case of rates 
jumping by 500bps. The magnitude of EPE is given as a percentage of IRS notional. 
 
